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Abstract
Networks of person-person contacts form the substrate along which infectious diseases spread. Most
network-based studies of the spread focus on the impact of variations in degree (the number of contacts
an individual has). However, other effects such as clustering, variations in infectiousness or susceptibil-
ity, or variations in closeness of contacts may play a significant role. We develop analytic techniques
to predict how these effects alter the growth rate, probability, and size of epidemics and validate the
predictions with a realistic social network. We find that (for given degree distribution and average trans-
missibility) clustering is the dominant factor controlling the growth rate, heterogeneity in infectiousness
is the dominant factor controlling the probability of an epidemic, and heterogeneity in susceptibility is
the dominant factor controlling the size of an epidemic. Edge weights (measuring closeness or duration
of contacts) have impact only if correlations exist between different edges. Combined, these effects can
play a minor role in reinforcing one another, with the impact of clustering largest when the population
is maximally heterogeneous or if the closer contacts are also strongly clustered. Our most significant
contribution is a systematic way to address clustering in infectious disease models, and our results have
a number of implications for the design of interventions.
1 Introduction
Recently H5N1 avian influenza and SARS have raised the profile of emerging infectious diseases. Both can
infect humans, but have a primary animal host. Typically such zoonotic diseases emerge periodically into
the human population and disappear (e.g., Ebola, Hanta Virus, and Rabies), but sometimes (e.g., HIV) the
disease achieves sustained person-to-person spread. With the advent of modern transportation networks,
diseases that formerly emerged in isolated villages and died out without further spread may now spread
worldwide.
A number of interventions are available to control emerging diseases, each with distinct costs and benefits.
To design optimal policies, we must address several related, but nevertheless distinct, questions. How fast
would an epidemic spread? How likely is a single introduced infection to result in an epidemic? How many
people would an epidemic infect? We quantify these using R0, the basic reproductive ratio, which measures
the average number of new cases each infection causes early in the outbreak; P , the probability that a single
infection sparks an epidemic; and A, the attack rate or fraction of the population infected in an epidemic.
Understanding these different quantities and what affects them helps us to select policies with maximal
impact for given cost.
Many different models are used to study disease spread. Perhaps the most important decision in de-
veloping a model is how the interactions of the population are represented. Because of the complexity of
the population, it is invariably necessary to make simplifying assumptions. The errors (and therefore, the
conclusions) resulting from many of these approximations are not well-quantified. In this paper we will
focus on quantifying the impact of clustering (the tendency to interact in small groups) and individual-scale
heterogeneity on the spread of an epidemic.
Based on how they handle clustering, models for population structure fit into a hierarchy of three classes
(which in turn may be subdivided). At the simplest level the population is assumed to mix without any
clustering. Most existing models fall into this category. At the most complex level, agent-based models are
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used: the movements of each individual are tracked, and people who are in the same location are able to
infect one another. These models typically require significant resources to develop, and the clustering is
explicitly included. An intermediate level of complexity attempts to introduce the clustering as a parameter
(or several parameters). Usually these models only consider clustering in terms of the number of triangles
in a network, but as we shall see, other structures may play a role.
Before introducing the details of our model, we review some previous work. All the models we consider
are Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epidemic models [2], in which individuals begin susceptible, become
infected by contacting infected individuals, and finally recover with immunity.
For unclustered populations, ordinary differential equation (ODE) models were among the earliest models
used [24] and remain the most common. They are deterministic, and so cannot directly calculate P , but they
give insight into the factors controlling R0 and A. Because they assume mass-action mixing, it is difficult to
incorporate individual heterogeneity in the number of contacts. More recently some network-based models
have been introduced for unclustered populations [3, 36, 23, 32, 29, 30, 31]. These models represent the pop-
ulation as nodes with edges between nodes representing contacts, along which disease spreads stochastically.
Heterogeneity in the number of contacts is introduced by modifying the degree (number of edges) of each
node. By neglecting clustering, these studies are able to make analytic predictions through branching process
arguments. A recent sociological study [35] used surveys with participants recording the length and nature
of their contacts. This data is valuable for providing the contact distribution needed for the above network
models, and allows us to apply network results to real populations. However, this data does not directly tell
us anything about the clustering of the population resulting from family/work/other groups. Other recent
work by [32, 23] analytically addresses the impact of heterogeneity in infectiousness and susceptibility in
unclustered networks.
Using agent-based simulations [15, 5, 11, 17, 19, 1] allows us to directly incorporate clustering. In these
simulations, the population is a collection of individuals who move and contact one another. The modeller
has complete control over the parameters governing interactions and how the disease spreads. This allows
us to study many effects, but also introduces many parameters. It is difficult to test the accuracy of the
assumptions used to generate these models and to extract which parameters are essential to the disease
dynamics. The expense of developing these simulations is frequently prohibitive.
In this paper we introduce a systematic approach for calculating the impact of clustering, and quantifying
the error. Because our model investigates disease spread in clustered networks, we provide a more detailed
review of previous work on clustering and disease. A few investigations have been made into the interaction of
clustering with disease spread using network models. The attempts that have been made [21, 14, 37, 40, 41, 8]
typically use approximations whose errors are not quantified, resulting in apparently contradictory results.
A few papers [33, 42, 25] have considered clustering and heterogeneities, rigorously showing that increased
heterogeneity tends to decrease P and A, but without quantitative predictions. Recently [14] considered the
spread of epidemics in a class of random networks for which the number of triangles could be controlled. It
may be inferred from their figure 3 that clustering decreases the growth rate and that sufficient clustering
can increase the epidemic threshold. However, at small and moderate levels clustering appears not to
alter the final size of epidemics significantly. Similar observations have been made by [4]. At first glance,
this contradicts observations of [40, 41] that clustering significantly reduces the size of epidemics, but that
sufficiently strong clustering reduces the epidemic threshold (see also [37]), allowing epidemics at lower
transmissibility. The discrepancy in epidemic size may be resolved by noting that the networks in [40, 41]
have low average degree. We will see that clustering only affects the size if the typical degree is small
or clustering is very high. The apparent discrepancy in epidemic threshold with strong clustering may
be resolved by noting that the form of strong clustering considered by [40, 41] forces preferential contacts
between high degree nodes. The reduction in epidemic threshold is perhaps better understood in terms of
degree-degree correlations than in terms of clustering.
In this paper we develop techniques to incorporate general small-scale structure (beyond triangles) into
the calculation of R0, P , and A. To calculate R0, we develop a systematic series expansion which allows
us to interpolate between unclustered and clustered results by including more terms. To calculate P and A,
we use a similar approach, but only give estimates on the size of correction terms. Our methods give us a
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Figure 1: A sample network and several stages of an outbreak. Nodes begin susceptible (small circles),
become infected (empty large circles), possibly infecting others along edges, and then recover (solid large
circles). The outbreak finishes when no infected nodes remain.
rigorous means to understand how unclustered results relate to more realistic populations, and our results
resolve the apparent discrepancies mentioned above. Our theory accurately predicts epidemic behaviour in a
more realistic contact network derived from an agent-based simulation of Portland, Oregon by EpiSimS [11].
We expand this to investigate the interplay of clustering, heterogeneities in individual infectiousness or
susceptibility, and variation in edge weights in their effect on R0, P , and A.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes our model and networks and summarises earlier
work on unclustered networks. These results will be the leading order terms for our expansions for clustered
networks in the remainder of the paper. Section 3 considers how epidemics spread in a clustered network
assuming homogeneous transmission. We derive the corrections toR0 and show that the corrections to P and
A are insignificant unless the typical degree is small or clustering very high. Section 4 considers epidemics
in clustered networks with heterogeneous infectiousness or susceptibility, building on section 3. Section 5
extends this further to consider epidemics spreading on clustered networks with weighted edges. Edges with
large weights tend to occur in family or work groups which magnifies the impact of clustering. Finally
section 6 discusses the implications of our results, particularly for designing interventions. We conclude that
in general, heterogeneity significantly impacts P and A, but notR0, while clustering impactsR0 significantly,
but not P and A. Heterogeneity or edge weights may enhance the impact of clustering.
2 Formulation
2.1 The disease model
We consider the spread of a disease using a discrete SIR model on a static network G. Nodes of G represent
individuals and edges represent (potentially infectious) contacts. The contact structure of the network is fixed
during the course of the outbreak. The degree k of a node u is the number of edges containing u. Figure 1
shows a sample outbreak. A single infection, the index case is chosen uniformly from the population to
begin an outbreak. Infection spreads along an edge from an infected node u to a susceptible node v with
probability Tuv, the transmissibility. The time it takes for infection and recovery to occur may vary but does
not affect our results. Once u recovers it cannot be reinfected. Typically for a large random network with
a population of N = |G| nodes, the final size of outbreaks is either large, with O(N) cumulative infections,
or small, with O(logN) infections [7]. Large outbreaks are epidemics and small outbreaks are non-epidemic
outbreaks.
2.1.1 Transmissibility
A number of factors influence the transmissibility from u to v such as the viral load and duration of infection
of u, the vaccination history and general health of v, the duration and nature of the contact between u and
v, and characteristics of the disease.
For each node u we denote its ability to infect others by Iu and its ability to be infected by Su. Each
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edge has a weight wuv. The parameter α measures disease-specific quantities. In most of our calculations
we assume these are scalars and follow [32, 10], setting
Tuv = T (Iu,Sv, wuv) = 1− e
−αIuSvwuv . (1)
If all contacts are identical, wuv may be absorbed into α
Tuv = T (Iu,Sv) = 1− e
−αIuSv . (2)
Note that Tuv is a number assigned to an edge, while T (Iu,Sv) is a function which states what the trans-
missibility between two nodes would be if they shared an edge.
With mild abuse of notation we denote the probability density functions (pdfs) of I, S, and w by
P (I), P (S), and P (w) respectively. We assign I and S independently, but allow w to be assigned either
independently or based on observed contacts (i.e., by observing contacts in a population we may create a
static network with edge weights assigned based on the observed contact). If w is assigned independently, then
it is possible to eliminate edge weights from the analysis by marginalising over the distribution of weights.
However, if weights are not independent (for example work or family contacts tend to have correlated weights)
then the details of the distribution and the correlations are important.
Given the infectiousness Iu of node u, we follow [32, 33] and define its out-transmissibility
Tout(u) =
∫∫
T (Iu,S, w)P (S)P (w) dS dw . (3)
This is the marginalised probability that u infects a randomly chosen neighbour given Iu. From the definition
of Tout and the pdf P (I) we can calculate the pdf Qout(Tout). We symmetrically define the in-transmissibility
Tin and its pdf Qin(Tin).
We denote the average of a quantity by 〈·〉. The average transmissibility 〈T 〉 is
〈T 〉 =
∫∫∫
T (I,S, w)P (I)P (S)P (w) dI dS dw . (4)
2.1.2 Epidemic percolation networks
Rather than studying outbreaks as dynamic processes on networks, we may consider them in the context of
Epidemic Percolation Networks (EPNs) [22, 23, 33]. The EPN framework allows us to study epidemics as
static objects and is useful for quickly estimating P , A, and R0. In this section we summarise properties of
EPNs; more details are provided in [22, 33, 32] and A.
Once the properties of the nodes and edges are assigned, an EPN E is created as follows: We place each
node of G into E . For each edge {u, v} in G we place directed edges (u, v) and (v, u) into E independently
with probability Tuv and Tvu respectively. The nodes infected in an outbreak correspond exactly to those
nodes that may be reached from the index case following edges of E . More specifically, the distribution of
out-components of a node u in different EPN realisations matches the distribution of outbreaks resulting
from different epidemic realisations in the original model with u as the index case. It may be shown that the
distributions of out- and in-component sizes give us information about the probability of nodes to start an
epidemic or become infected in an epidemic. We will see that in a large population the structure of a single
EPN can be used to accurately estimate P , A, and R0.
Once we create an EPN and choose the index case, we define the rank of node v as the length of the
shortest directed path from the index case to v.1 If no such path exists, v is never infected.
Interchanging all arrow directions interchanges P and A. This means that if we can calculate P , then
A may be calculated by the same technique, but with the direction of infection reversed. Because of this,
we focus our attention on calculating P , and apply the same methodology to calculate A. An important
consequence is that if T is constant, then P = A [36, 32].
1We follow [26] in using the term rank rather than generation which has been used elsewhere, but is potentially ambiguous.
The rank is the shortest number of infectious contacts between the index case and a node. It is possible that a different path
takes less time. The path infection actually follows is the path that is shorter in time, rather than number of links.
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2.1.3 The basic reproductive ratio
We expect that epidemics are possible if and only if the basic reproductive ratio R0 is greater than 1. That
is, if an average infection causes more than one new case, an epidemic may occur, but otherwise the outbreak
dies out quickly. However, this use of R0 is not consistent with the typical definition: the average number
of new infections caused by a single infected individual introduced into a fully susceptible population, which
gives R0 = 〈T 〉 〈k〉. A more appropriate definition is the average number of new infections caused by infected
individuals early in outbreaks. The distinction is subtle, but results from the fact that whether an outbreak
can grow depends on whether the people of low rank infect more than one person each [12]. Low rank
individuals may be different from the average individual. Most obviously, they have more contacts [36, 16];
but with clustering, they also have a disproportionately large fraction of neighbours infected or recovered.
In order to quantify R0 more rigorously, we first define Nr to be the number of people of rank r for a
given outbreak simulation. We then define the rank reproductive ratio
R0,r =
E[Nr+1]
E[Nr]
(5)
to be the expected number of new cases caused by a rank r node (averaged over all possible outbreak
realisations). R0,0 = 〈T 〉 〈k〉 corresponds to the usual definition of R0. In practise, we find that R0,r
reaches a plateau quickly as r increases before eventually decreasing as the finite size of the population
becomes important. Consequently, an improved definition of R0 is the limit of R0,r as r grows, subject to
the assumption that R0,r is unaffected by the finite size of G. This gives (cf, [42])
R0 = lim
r→∞
lim
|G|→∞
R0,r . (6)
and generalises the definition given by [12] for ODE models. Under this definition, epidemics are possible if
R0 > 1, but not if R0 < 1. We discuss this further in B. In a large population considering multiple index
cases with a single EPN gives a good estimate of E[Nr] and hence R0,r.
2.2 Configuration Model Networks
We consider two different types of networks. The first is a class of (unclustered) random networks for which
we can derive analytic results based only on the degree distribution. These analytic results will form the
leading order term of our perturbation expansions. The second is a more complicated network resulting from
an agent-based simulation, which we will use to demonstrate the accuracy of our perturbation expansions.
Our random networks are created by an algorithm which has been discovered independently a number
of times (see e.g., [34] and [6]). These have come to be called Configuration Model (CM) [38] networks.
These networks are maximally random given the degree distribution. As the number of nodes in a CM
network grows, the frequency of short cycles becomes negligible. The resulting lack of clustering allows us
to calculate analytic results for epidemics. We briefly discuss these results assuming T is constant. More
details are in [3, 36, 30, 23, 32, 39, 28] and C (which also addresses edge weights).
In the early stages of an outbreak in a CM network, the probability that a newly infected (non-index
case) node has degree k is kP (k)/ 〈k〉. Clustering is unimportant and so the node will have k− 1 susceptible
neighbours, regardless of its rank. Thus the expected number of infections caused by a newly infected node
is
R0 = T
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈k〉
. (7)
To calculate the probability P that infection of a randomly chosen index case results in an epidemic, we
instead calculate the probability f = 1− P that it does not. Then f is the probability that each neighbour
of the index case either is not infected, or is infected but does not start an epidemic. Defining h to be the
probability that a secondary case does not start an epidemic,
f =
∑
k
P (k)[1 − T + Th]k . (8)
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We find a similar relation for h, except that the probability for a secondary case to have degree k is kP (k)/ 〈k〉
and only k − 1 neighbours are susceptible
h =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kP (k)[1− T + Th]k−1 . (9)
We solve this recurrence relation for h numerically, and use the result to find f . P follows immediately.
Because T is constant, this also gives A [36, 32].
If T is not constant, the calculation becomes more difficult, and is discussed further in C and [23, 32]. In
general, if T can vary for CM networks, R0 = 〈T 〉
〈
k2 − k
〉
/ 〈k〉, while P and A are overestimated by the
values calculated assuming constant T .
2.3 The EpiSimS Network
We are interested in understanding the impact of clustering on disease spread. The term clustering is rather
vague, and is usually measured by the number of triangles in a network [43]. However, any sufficiently short
cycles impact the spread of an infectious disease. For our purposes we think of a clustered network as a
network with enough short cycles to impact disease dynamics.
It is relatively simple to measure the degree distribution of a population using survey methods. We can
easily calculate P , A, and R0 for a CM network with the same degree distribution, but the error between
these values and the values for the original clustered network are unknown. Our goal in this paper is to
develop analytical techniques to quantify these errors.
To test our predictions we turn to an agent-based network derived from a single EpiSimS [11, 15, 5]
simulation of Portland, Oregon. The simulation includes roads, buildings, and a statistically accurate (based
on Census data) population of approximately 1.6 million people who perform daily tasks based on popula-
tion surveys. This gives a highly detailed knowledge of the interactions in the synthetic population. The
degree distribution and contact structure emerge from the simulation. The resulting network has significant
clustering and average degree of about 16. More details are in D.
3 Clustered networks with homogeneous nodes
In this section we assume that the population is homogeneous and all contacts are equally weighted. Con-
sequently transmissibility is constant: Tuv = T for all edges. It follows that P = A [36, 32]. We develop a
predictive theory for P , A, and R0 and test the theory with simulations on the EpiSimS network. We begin
with R0.
3.1 The basic reproductive ratio
The simulated rank reproductive ratioR0,r is shown in figure 2 for 0 ≤ r ≤ 4. At all values of T , R0,0 = T 〈k〉
is clearly distinct fromR0,r, r > 0 (which are close together). For r > 0,R0,r is asymptotic to the unclustered
approximation T
〈
k2 − k
〉
/ 〈k〉 as T → 0. This is because at small T the disease only rarely follows all edges
of short cycles and so clustering has no impact. As T increases, these curves lie significantly below the
unclustered approximation, because clustering reduces the number of available susceptibles. R0,4 peels away
from R0,1, R0,2, and R0,3 for larger T because the population is finite, and so the number of susceptibles
available to infect after rank four is reduced. In larger populations, R0,4 would not deviate.
We conclude that R0,r converges quickly, and that R0,1 is a good approximation to R0, but R0,0 is
not. This implies that the network has important structure contained in paths of length 2, but not in paths
of length 3. This fortunate observation allows us to approximate R0 by R0,1, which we may analytically
calculate with relative ease (R0,r becomes combinatorially hard as r grows). To find R0,1 = E[N2]/E[N1] we
first note that E[N1] = T 〈k〉. Calculating E[N2] is more difficult: consider all pairs of nodes u and v with
at least one path of length 2 between them. Let nuv be the number of paths of length 2 between u and v
and χuv be an indicator function: χuv = 1 if {u, v} is an edge and χuv = 0 if it is not (see figure 3). The
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Figure 2: Simulated values of the rank reproductive ratio R0,r = E[Nr+1]/E[Nr] for r = 0, . . . , 4 using
an EPN from the (fixed) EpiSimS network with a homogeneous population, compared with the unclustered
prediction. At small T (right panel) R0,1–R0,4 match the unclustered prediction.
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Figure 3: Different options for paths of length two between nodes u and v.
probability that an infection of u results in infection of v in exactly two steps is [1− (1− T 2)nuv ][1− T ]χuv .
Summing this over all pairs yields
E[N2] =
1
N
∑
u
∑
v 6=u
[1− (1 − T 2)nuv ][1− T ]χuv ,
(where N is the size of the population and each pair u and v appears twice) which allows us to calculate
R0,1 exactly. This sum is straightforward to calculate, but we can increase our understanding with a small
T expansion. We approximate E[N2] for T ≪ 1 by
E[N2] =
1
N
∑
u
∑
v 6=u
T 2nuv(1− T )
χuv −
(
nuv
2
)
T 4 +O(T 5) ,
= T 2
〈
k2 − k
〉
− 2T 3 〈n△〉 − T
4 〈n〉+O(T
5) ,
where 〈n△〉 =
1
N
∑
u
∑
v 6=u nuvχuv is the average number of triangles each node is in, and 〈n〉 =
1
N
∑
u
∑
v 6=u
(
nuv
2
)
is the average number of squares each node is in (cf, [20]). Higher order terms involve more complicated
shapes. This gives
R0,1 =
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈k〉
T −
2 〈n△〉
〈k〉
T 2 −
〈n〉
〈k〉
T 3 +O
(
T 4
〈k〉
)
. (10)
At leading order we recover the unclustered prediction for R0, reflecting the fact that at small T the
probability the outbreak follows all edges of a cycle is negligible. As T increases, the first corrections are
due to triangles, then squares, then pairs of triangles sharing an edge, and sequentially larger and larger
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Figure 4: Comparison of first three asymptotic approximations for R0,1 from equation (10) with the exact
value (solid) for the EpiSimS network. The right panel shows the comparison at small T .
structures made up of paths of length two. A comparison of these approximations with the exact value is
shown in figure 4.
Although we have defined R0 for an ensemble of realisations, figure 5 shows that R0,1 accurately predicts
the observed ratio Nr+1/Nr for individual simulations once the outbreaks are well-established. Early in
outbreaks, the behaviour is dominated by stochastic effects, and so the ratio of successive rank sizes is noisy.
Once the outbreak has grown large enough, random events become unimportant and the ratio settles at
R0,1.
2
Figure 5: The progression of ten simulated epidemics for (left) T = 0.1 and (right) T = 0.2 in the EpiSimS
network. The left panels show Nr+1/Nr against rank and right panels show the cumulative fraction of the
population infected.
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Figure 6: Probability P and attack rate A of epidemics for the (clustered) EpiSimS network (+) versus T ,
compared to the prediction derived from the degree distribution assuming no clustering. Each data point is
from a single EPN, (the variation in P resulting from different EPNs is negligible).
3.2 Epidemic probability and size
In order to assess the effect of clustering on P and A, we compare epidemics on the EpiSimS network with
the analytic predictions derived assuming a CM network of the same degree distribution in figure 6. The
epidemic threshold is not noticeably altered, and the values of P and A are almost indistinguishable from
the predictions made assuming no clustering, despite the large amount of clustering in the network.
Although initially surprising, these results may be understood intuitively as follows: if T is large enough
that the disease follows all edges of a short cycle then some other edge from a node of that cycle is likely to
start an epidemic and the cycle does not prevent an epidemic. On the other hand, if T is smaller so that it
does not follow all edges of a cycle, then the disease never sees the existence of the cycle, and the outbreak
progresses as if there were no cycle.
To make this more rigorous, we first look at the epidemic threshold. We assume R0 is well-approximated
by R0,1. Let T0 = 〈k〉 /
〈
k2 − k
〉
be the threshold without clustering and T0 + δT be the threshold found by
including the correction due to triangles. From equation (10) it follows that
δT
T0
=
2 〈n△〉 〈k〉
〈k2 − k〉
2 +O


[
2 〈n△〉 〈k〉
〈k2 − k〉
2
]2 . (11)
Because a given node of degree k is contained in at most (k2−k)/2 triangles, we conclude 2 〈n△〉 /
〈
k2 − k
〉
≤
1. So if 〈k〉 /
〈
k2 − k
〉
is small the leading order term of equation (11) is small and triangles do not significantly
2Early noise controls how quickly outbreaks become epidemics, and so once stochastic effects become small, the curves
appear to be translations in time. We note that it is common to consider the temporal average of a number of outbreaks.
However, prior to taking an average, the curves should be shifted in time so that they coincide once the stochastic effects are
no longer important. Failure to do so underestimates the early growth, peak incidence, and late decay while it overestimates
the epidemic duration. This can lead to an incorrect understanding of “typical” outbreaks.
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alter the epidemic threshold regardless of the density of triangles. For the EpiSimS network, 〈k〉 /
〈
k2 − k
〉
takes the value 0.046, and so we do not anticipate clustering to play an important role in determining the
threshold.
Above threshold, we assume that P may be expanded much like (10)
P = P0 + P1 〈n△〉+ P2 〈n△〉
2
+ · · ·+Q1 〈n〉+ · · · . (12)
where P0 is the epidemic probability in a CM network of the same degree distribution. Although calculating
R0,1 only requires information about nodes of distance at most two from the index case, P may depend on
effects occurring at larger distance, and so the expansion has many additional terms. In general, we expect
that if the average degree is large, then the various coefficients of the correction terms are all small. The
larger a structure is, the smaller we expect its corresponding coefficient to be. The coefficient for triangles
P1 may be found by
P1 〈n△〉 = −
1
N
∑
u∈G
∑
△∈G
pˆ△(u) ,
where pˆ△(u) is the probability that a given triangle prevents an epidemic if u is the index case (regardless
of whether u is part of the triangle). Reversing the order of summation we get
P1 〈n△〉 = −
N△
N
〈∑
u∈G
pˆ△(u)
〉
△
= −
1
3
〈n△〉
〈∑
u∈G
pˆ△(u)
〉
△
,
where N△ is the number of triangles in G and 〈·〉△ is the average of the given quantity taken over all
triangles. Thus
P1 = −
1
3
〈∑
u∈G
pˆ△(u)
〉
△
,
and we can find P1 by considering the average effect of a single triangle in an unclustered network.
To calculate the impact of a triangle with nodes u, v, and w on P for a given network, we consider that
triangle and a randomly chosen edge {x, y} elsewhere in the network. If we replace the edges {v, w} and
{x, y} with {v, x} and {w, y}, then we have a new network without the triangle, but with the same degree
distribution. We must estimate the expected change in P caused by switching the edges.
We begin by assuming u is the index case. The triangle can affect P only if the infection tries to cross all
three edges, that is, if the infection process ‘loses’ an edge because of clustering. This may happen in three
distinct ways. In the first, node u infects both v and w, and then v and/or w tries to infect the other. In
the second u infects v but not w, then v infects w, and finally w tries to infect u. The third is symmetric to
the second (with u infecting w).
To leading order we can ignore other short cycles, so the probability that an edge leading out of u (not to
v or w) will not cause an epidemic is g = 1−T +Th, where h (as before) is the probability that a randomly
chosen secondary case does not cause an epidemic in an unclustered network and can be calculated using
equation (9).
We perform a sample calculation with the first case: u infects both v and w. Assume that u has degree
ku, v has degree kv, and w has degree kw. The probability that u infects both v and w without some other
edge leading from u, v, or w starting an epidemic is T 2gku+kv+kw−6. If the {v, w} edge were broken and v
and w were joined to x and y respectively (see figure 7), then the new probability of u to infect both v and w
without an epidemic becomes T 2gku+kv+kw−4. The difference is T 2gku+kv+kw−6(1−g2), which is the product
of three terms, all at most 1. If the sum ku + kv + kw is moderately large, then either g
ku+kv+kw−6 ≪ 1
or 1 − g2 ≪ 1 (if g is not close to 1 then the first term is small, otherwise the second term is small). Thus
the triangle has little impact on the epidemic probability in this case.3 Similar analysis applies to the other
two cases where the w to u or v to u infections are lost. Provided the typical sum of degrees of nodes in
3If P is small, then the relative change may be large, but the absolute change is small.
10
Figure 7: Replacing the edges {v, w} and {x, y} with {v, x} and {w, y} breaks the triangle and allows more
infections, without affecting the degree distribution.
a triangle is relatively large, the probability of an epidemic when the index case is in the triangle is not
impacted significantly.
If the index case is not part of the triangle, then the above analysis is modified because we must also
consider each node in the path from the index case to the triangle. We must first calculate the probability
that infection reaches a node in the triangle while simultaneously no intermediate node sparks an epidemic,
and then we calculate the probability as above that the triangle prevents an epidemic. If the index case is
u1 and the path from u1 to the triangle goes through u2, . . . , un and then reaches u, then the probability
that the triangle prevents an epidemic pˆ(u1) is given by T
n(g−2n+
P
i
kui )pˆ(u). This falls off very quickly,
and so nodes not in the triangle are unimportant, unless typical degrees are small.
In contrast, in a network with small average degree and a significant number of triangles this becomes
significant. This explains observations of [41, 40] who use networks with average degree less than 3 and find
that clustering significantly alters A.
It is tempting to generalise our conclusion and state that if the average degree is large, clustering has
no impact on P or A. However, there are a number of counter-examples: consider a network made up of
isolated cliques with Nc nodes, then in expansion (12) the coefficient for cliques of Nc nodes will not be small.
Consequently care must be taken when using such an expansion to ensure that neglected terms resulting
from larger scale structures are in fact negligible. For social networks, we generally anticipate this highly
segregated situation to be unimportant.
We conclude that for most reasonable networks, clustering is only important for P and A if the typical
degrees of nodes are low in which case R0 is small. A consequence of these results is that if R0 is moderately
large, then P and A are effectively unaltered by clustering. If R0 is small, however, clustering may or may
not play a role in determining P and A, depending on whether R0 is small because the degrees are small or
because T is small.
4 Clustered networks with heterogeneous nodes
When we drop the assumption of constant transmissibility, disease spread becomes more complicated. If I
is heterogeneous and u infects a neighbour, then the a posteriori expectation for Tout(u) becomes higher:
it is likely to infect more neighbours. This accentuates the effect of short cycles, enhancing the impact of
clustering on R0, P , and A. A similar argument applies with heterogeneity in S: if v is not infected by one
of its neighbours, then the a posteriori expectation for Tin(v) becomes lower: it is less likely to be infected
by other neighbours, and so has multiple opportunities to prevent an epidemic. Again this accentuates the
effect of short cycles.
In this section we investigate how varying the infectiousness and susceptibility of nodes in the EpiSimS
network enables clustering to alter the values of P and A. We will make use of the ordering assumption and
its consequences from [33]: if u1 is “more infectious” than u2 in a given instance [or v1 “more susceptible”
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Symbol Infectiousness Susceptibility
P (I) = δ(I − 1) P (S) = 0.5δ(S − 0.001) + 0.5δ(S − 1)
P (I) = 0.3δ(I − 0.001) + 0.7δ(I − 1) P (S) = δ(S − 1)
P (I) = 0.5δ(I − 0.1) + 0.5δ(I − 1) P (S) = 0.2δ(S − 0.1) + 0.8δ(S − 1)
P (I) = 0.5δ(I − 0.1) + 0.5δ(I − 1) P (S) = 0.8δ(S − 0.01) + 0.2δ(S − 1)
Maximally heterogeneous P (Tout) =
〈T 〉 δ(Tout − 1) + (1− 〈T 〉)δ(Tout)
Homogeneous Tin = 〈T 〉
Table 1: For the calculations of sections 4 and 5 we determine Tuv using equations (2) and (1) with the
distributions of I and S given in the first four rows, or by considering a maximally heterogeneous population
for which 〈T 〉 of the population infects all neighbours and 1 − 〈T 〉 infect no neighbours. The function δ is
the Dirac delta function.
than v2], then u1 is always more infectious than u2 [or v1 always more susceptible than v2]. More specifically,
the ordering assumption states that if Tout(u1) > Tout(u2), then T (Iu1 ,S) ≥ T (Iu2 ,S) for all S, and the
corresponding statement for Tin. The results of [33] show that if the ordering assumption holds, heterogeneity
tends to reduce P and A, and the upper bounds on P and A correspond to homogeneous populations
(constant T ).
For simulations in this section, we consider five different illustrative cases, which will be denoted through-
out by the symbol given in table 1. In the first four, we use equation (2) so that Tuv = 1− e
−αIuSv with the
distribution of I and S varying for each. We vary α to change the average transmissibility. In the fifth case
the out-transmissibility is maximally heterogeneous: A fraction 〈T 〉 of the population infect all neighbours,
while the remaining 1− 〈T 〉 infect no neighbours.
The fifth case gives a lower bound on P for a homogeneously susceptible population [42]. It is hypothesised
to remain a lower bound on P if susceptibility is allowed to vary [33]. We could also consider maximal
heterogeneity in susceptibility, but the results for P and A merely correspond to interchanging their values
for maximal heterogeneity in infectiousness, and so we do not need to consider it explicitly.
4.1 The basic reproductive ratio
We use simulations to calculate the rank reproductive ratio R0,r for the cases of table 1 and plot the result
for 0 ≤ r ≤ 4 in figure 8. Note that R0,1 remains a good approximation to R0. In the first four cases, R0 is
again again asymptotic to the unclustered approximation as 〈T 〉 → 0. There are small kinks for and
at 〈T 〉 = 0.5 and 〈T 〉 = 0.7 respectively, resulting from the nature of those distributions. The heterogeneities
act to enhance the effect of clustering on R0, but the effect is relatively small.
In the final, maximally heterogeneous case , R0,1 remains a good approximation to R0. At small
values of 〈T 〉, the heterogeneity causes clustering to have a larger impact than in a homogeneous population
as seen in the lower right panel of figure 8, and so this is not asymptotic to the unclustered approximation.
At larger values of 〈T 〉 the heterogeneous and homogeneous growth rates are similar.
As before, we can calculate R0,1 analytically, which helps explain our observations. If the ordering
assumption holds, we may use a simplified notation T (Tout, Tin) to denote the transmissibility from a node
with out-transmissibility Tout to a node with in-transmissibility Tin.
4 We have E[N1] = 〈T 〉 〈k〉 and
E[N2] =
1
N
∑
u
∑
v 6=u
∫∫
[1− (1 − ToutTin)
nuv ][1− T (Tout, Tin)]
χuvQout(Tout)Qin(Tin)dToutdTin
=
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈T 〉
2
− 2 〈n△〉 〈ToutTinT (Tout, Tin)〉 − 〈n〉
〈
T 2out
〉 〈
T 2in
〉
+ · · · ,
and so we may express the growth rate as a perturbation about the unclustered case R0 = 〈T 〉
〈
k2 − k
〉
/ 〈k〉
4We can use this notation because the ordering assumption allows us to uniquely identify I from Tout and S from Tin. If
the ordering assumption fails, similar results hold, but the notation is more cumbersome.
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Figure 8: R0,r = E[Nr+1]/E[Nr] calculated from simulations for the heterogeneous examples of table 1.
The final panel (lower right) compares R0,1 for all of the different cases, including both unclustered and
homogeneous.
giving
R0,1 =
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈k〉
〈T 〉 −
2 〈n△〉
〈k〉
〈ToutTinT (Tout, Tin)〉
〈T 〉
−
〈n〉
〈k〉
〈
T 2out
〉 〈
T 2in
〉
〈T 〉
+ · · · . (13)
For the second term, it may be shown that 〈T 〉
3
≤ 〈ToutTinT (Tout, Tin)〉 ≤ 〈T 〉
2
. The minimum occurs
when T is constant, suggesting that the maximum growth rate occurs in a homogeneous population. The
maximum 〈T 〉
2
occurs either for :
Qout(Tout) = (1− 〈T 〉)δ(Tout) + 〈T 〉 δ(Tout − 1) , (14)
that is, when the out-transmissibility is maximally heterogeneous, or when the in-transmissibility is maxi-
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Figure 9: Comparison of P and A observed from simulations in the clustered EpiSimS network with
heterogeneities (symbols) with that predicted by the unclustered theory (curves) using table 1. Each data
point is based on a single EPN. For both and Tin(v) = 〈T 〉 for all nodes, and so the unclustered
prediction for A is the same.
mally heterogeneous:
Qin(Tin) = (1− 〈T 〉)δ(Tin) + 〈T 〉 δ(Tin − 1) . (15)
Consequently, we expect that for given 〈T 〉 the minimum growth rate occurs with maximally heterogeneous
infectiousness or susceptibility. These two minima for R0,1 have previously been hypothesised to give lower
bounds on P and A respectively [33].
We note that in the maximally heterogeneous case, the correction term in (13) is significant at leading
order in T . Consequently, if 〈n△〉 is comparable to
〈
k2 − k
〉
/2 (that is, the clustering coefficient [43] is
comparable to 1), the threshold value of 〈T 〉 may be increased by clustering, and R0 is not asymptotic to
the unclustered prediction as 〈T 〉 → 0.
4.2 Probability and size
Figure 9 shows that the unclustered predictions provide a good estimate of P and A in the clustered EpiSimS
network. We expect that in a network with sufficiently large average degree, the impact of clustering should
once again be small.
We use arguments similar to before, taking a triangle with nodes u, v, and w. The reasoning becomes
more difficult because knowledge that u infects v may increase the expectation that u infects w. Consequently
the lost edges in triangles are more frequently encountered by the outbreak. However, the knowledge that
u infects v also increases the expectation that u infects its other neighbours. For a triangle to prevent an
epidemic, we need both that no edge outside the triangle leads to an epidemic and that the lost edge would
otherwise have caused an epidemic. If the typical degree of the network is not small, then the fact that the
lost edge is encountered more frequently may be offset by the fact that when it is encountered, other edges
are more likely to spark an epidemic.
For where nodes infect all or none of their neighbours, the effect of different triangles that share
the index case cannot be separated as easily. The probability the index case directly infects a set of m
nodes of interest is 〈T 〉, rather than Tm. Thus expansions as in (12) do not work as well: terms that were
previously higher order become significant. Close to the epidemic threshold, this can play an important role.
However, well above the epidemic threshold, if the index case infects all of its neighbours, an epidemic is
almost guaranteed and so P ≈ 〈T 〉 regardless of whether the network is clustered. Thus for , clustering
affects P only close to the epidemic threshold.
In the opposite case where nodes would be infected by any neighbour or else no neighbour, the values of
P and A are interchanged. Thus for maximally heterogeneous susceptibility P could be significantly altered
close to the threshold. The reason for this is as follows: For the first step the spread is indistinguishable from
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Figure 10: R0,r, P , and A for the weighted EpiSimS network with a homogeneous population.
that of an outbreak with constant T . However, when infections of rank 1 attempt to infect their neighbours,
they cannot infect any of the neighbours of the index case. In contrast, in the constant T case, any neighbour
not infected by the index case would be susceptible at later steps. Consequently, the impact of triangles
becomes much more important (by a factor of 1/ 〈T 〉) and our earlier argument for neglecting them fails.
The interaction of maximal heterogeneity with clustering in this case is larger, but it nevertheless becomes
unimportant far from the threshold.
Our prediction that heterogeneity allows clustering to be more significant close to the threshold is borne
out for where there is relatively strong heterogeneity in susceptibility just above the epidemic threshold.
The epidemic threshold for is increased compared to the other cases. In contrast there is much stronger
heterogeneity in susceptibility for at 〈T 〉 = 0.5 and in infectiousness for at 〈T 〉 = 0.7. This results in
a reduction in A and P respectively, but because it is far from threshold, there is little deviation from the
unclustered predictions.
5 Clustered networks with weighted edges
When we allow edges to be weighted, new complications arise. The weights we use in our simulations are
the durations of contacts from the EpiSimS simulation and are discussed in detail in D. If a contact in
the original EpiSimS simulation is longer, a higher weight is assigned. If the weights of different edges
were independent, then we could simply take Tuv =
∫
T (Iu,Sv, w)P (w) dw. However, edge weights are not
independent: clustered connections tend to have larger weights. If brief contacts are negligible, the disease
spreads on a subnetwork of the original network. The new network has a comparable number of short cycles
to the original, but lower typical degree. This should enhance the impact of clustering.
For our calculations in this section, we first isolate the impact of weighted edges by taking a homogeneous
population (I = S = 1) and using Tuv = 1− e
−αwuv . We vary α in order to set 〈T 〉. We then investigate a
heterogeneous population using equation (1) with the first four distributions of table 1.
Results for a homogeneous population are shown in figure 10. Because Tuv = Tvu for all pairs, it follows
that P = A. If different edge weights were uncorrelated, then the value of R0 would match with figure 2 and
P and A would match with figure 6. We see, however, that R0 is significantly reduced from the homogeneous
unweighted population (but R0,1 remains a good approximation). Close to the threshold P and A are mildly
reduced. These observations are consistent with our expectation that clustering should be accentuated by
incorporating edge weights. Although the predictions for P and A are not far off, we expect that they would
improve if we adjusted the degree distribution to match that of the effective network on which the disease
spreads.
When the population is moderately heterogeneous (figure 11), we still find that R0,1 is a reasonable
approximation to the true value of R0, however, it slightly underestimates R0 as 〈T 〉 grows. Unfortunately
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Figure 11: R0,r with heterogeneous transmissibility and weighted edges on the EpiSimS network.
the analytic calculation of R0,1 is much more difficult, and so it is more appropriate to use simulations to
estimate its value. If there were no correlation between weights of different edges, then the calculation would
reduce to that of section 4.
We consider P and A in figure 12. The unclustered predictions are reasonable approximations of the
actual values. The error is larger than before because we have combined two effects (edge weights and
heterogeneity) that both accentuate the impact of clustering. In spite of this, the predicted values of P
and A are not far off, and the direction of the error is consistent: the unclustered prediction is always an
overestimate.
6 Discussion
We have investigated the interplay of clustering, node heterogeneity, and edge weights on the growth rate
R0, probability P , and size of epidemics A in social networks. For unclustered networks with independently
distributed edge weights, it is possible to predict all these quantities analytically. Under weak assumptions
we can accurately estimate R0, P , and A for clustered networks.
If the typical degrees are not small, then for a given average transmissibility and degree distribution:
• The dominant effect controlling the growth rate of epidemics is clustering. Increased clustering reduces
R0.
• The dominant effect controlling the probability of epidemics is heterogeneity in infectiousness. In-
creased heterogeneity reduces P
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Figure 12: Simulated P and A (symbols) for the weighted EpiSims network compared with predictions in
unclustered networks with the same edge weight distribution (curves).
• The dominant effect controlling the size of epidemics is heterogeneity in susceptibility. Increased
heterogeneity reduces A
We are thus able to neglect clustering and still closely estimate P based only on the degree distribution
and the out-transmissibility pdf Qout. The estimate for A depends only on degree distribution and the
in-transmissibility pdf Qin. The impact of clustering is significant in altering R0, and its impact is mildly
enhanced by heterogeneities. This enhancement occurs because the probability of following all edges of a
cycle is increased if some of the edges are correlated due to the heterogeneity. If heterogeneity is large,
clustering may play a small role in moving the epidemic threshold, but otherwise its effect on the threshold
is negligible. In networks with small typical degree, it has been observed that clustering can modify P or
A [41, 40], which is consistent with our estimates.
If edge weights are included, but are independently distributed, then their impact is in modifying Qin(Tin)
and Qout(Tout). The resulting modification may be calculated explicitly, and edge weights have no further
effect. If edge weights are correlated, they have a more important role in governing the behaviour of epidemics,
particularly if higher weight edges tend to be the clustered edges (as frequently occurs in social networks). If
this happens, then the impact of clustering is enhanced, and the growth rate of epidemics is further reduced.
When we move from predicting P and A to predicting R0, we find that the growth rate is well approxi-
mated by R0,1 = E[N2]/E[N1]. This may be calculated analytically in the homogeneous case (constant T ).
When heterogeneities are included, the calculation becomes harder, and when edge weights are included it
becomes largely intractable. However, these are easily estimated through simulation.
These observations show that using R0 to predict A will generally be inadequate. In a homogeneous but
clustered population, R0 is reduced but A is unaffected, and so predictions of A based on R0 will be too
small. In networks that are not clustered but have heterogeneities in susceptibility, R0 is unaffected but A
is substantially reduced. Consequently, the value of A predicted from R0 will be too large.
Perhaps our most important conclusion about clustering is that it plays an important role in altering the
growth of an epidemic, but it only plays a small role in determining whether an epidemic may occur or how
big it would be. If the relevant questions are, “how likely is an epidemic and how large would it be?” then
the modeller may proceed ignoring clustering. If however, the question is “how fast will an epidemic grow?”
then clustering must be considered, but only enough to calculate R0,1.
Our results have implications for designing intervention strategies. A number of strategies are available to
control epidemic spread, including travel restrictions, quarantines, and vaccination. Most of the mathemati-
cal theory predicting the effects of these strategies has been developed under the assumption of no clustering.
Most immediately, if we measure R0 = 2 at the early stages of an epidemic, traditional approaches will sug-
gest that vaccinating just over half of the population will bring the epidemic below threshold. However, if
the population is clustered, then the observed R0 was already affected by the fact that some transmission
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chains were redundant. Following vaccination, some of these chains will no longer be redundant and the
disease may still spread with R0 > 1.
Achieving a better understanding of the effect of clustering further helps to guide our intuition when
choosing between strategies. For example, let us assume that we have the choice between two strategies: in
the first, we stagger work schedules in such a way that a typical person’s contacts is reduced by 1/3; in the
second, we implement population-wide behavior changes so that the same reduction in number of contacts
is achieved, but the work contacts are unaltered. The first reduces clustering while the second increases the
relative frequency of clustering. The value of R0 is much smaller in the second case than in the first because
of the larger clustering, but P and A are reduced by a comparable amount in both cases. Which strategy is
best depends on our goals and relative costs.
Strategies that enhance heterogeneity in infectiousness or susceptibility can be important to help reduce
P or A, even when there is little impact on R0. Depending on which quantity we want to minimize, different
choices will be optimal. Consider a choice between vaccinating all individuals with a vaccine that reduces
Tuv by a factor of 1/2 for all pairs u and v or a contact tracing strategy that will remove 1/2 of all new
infections before they have a chance to infect anyone. Both strategies reduce 〈T 〉 by a half. However, the
first reduces Tout uniformly, while the second increases heterogeneity in Tout. Thus if we have the choice of
the two strategies, contact tracing is more likely to eliminate the disease before an epidemic can happen.
If our choice is instead between a global vaccine reducing Tin by a factor of 1/2 for all individuals, or a
completely effective vaccine that is only available for 1/2 of the population, the latter choice will be more
effective for reducing A.
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A Epidemic Percolation Networks
In this appendix, we describe the Epidemic Percolation Network (EPN), a tool that allows us to consider
an epidemic as a static object rather than a dynamically changing process. This eases the understanding
of certain key features and provides an improved technique to efficiently estimate P . EPNs have received
moderate use recently [23, 22, 33], and a precursor appeared in [26]. A sample EPN for an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
network of average degree 3 and T = 0.4 is shown in figure 13.
Typically to estimate P in an SIR model many Monte Carlo simulations are performed. This process
requires many iterations to have confidence in the results. Representative results from 500 such simulations
are found in figure 14. Note that there is considerably more noise in the estimates of P than in the estimates
of A.
Instead we generate a single EPN E . We first assign I and S to each node and (if necessary) w to each
edge.5 Then for each node u and neighbour v we calculate Tuv and place the directed edge (u, v) into E with
probability Tuv. The distribution of out-components of a given node is the same as for the final outbreak
following an introduced infection of that node in the original epidemic model.
5It is important that this assignment occur prior to infection [or at least independent of outbreak history]. If the infectiousness
of v depends on the infectiousness of the node that infected v, then these results fail. This is the time-homogeneity assumption
of [22] and is also used by [26]. Some effects that can occur when this assumption is false appear in [18].
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Figure 13: The underlying network for figure 1 and an EPN that leads to the same outbreak. Nodes in the
Gscc are denoted by large circles, nodes in the Gin (but not in the Gscc) are denoted by pentagons, nodes
in the Gout (but not in the Gscc) are denoted by triangles, and nodes not in any of these components are
denoted by small circles.
Figure 14: P and A in an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network of 105 nodes and 〈k〉 = 4. Theory (curves) compare well
with results of 500 simulations (symbols). We take Tuv = 1 − e
−αIuSv , with distributions of I and S as
given in table 1.
If the system is above the epidemic threshold, then E will (almost surely) have a giant strongly connected
component Gscc [9, 13]. We follow [13] and define the set of nodes (including Gscc) from which Gscc may
be reached following the directed edges to be the giant in-component Gin. We symmetrically define Gout to
be the set of nodes reachable from Gscc. Note that Gscc = Gin ∩ Gout. If the initial infection is in Gin, an
epidemic occurs, and all nodes in Gout become infected. Thus the size of Gin corresponds to the probability
of an epidemic P and the size of Gout corresponds to the size of an epidemic A. This may be seen by
comparing the EPN in figure 13 with the outbreak shown in figure 1.6
Thus in the limit of large networks, epidemic probability is well-approximated by P = |Gin|/|G| while the
fraction infected is well-approximated by A = |Gout|/|G|. This observation allows us to estimate P from a
single EPN (figure 15), rather than from hundreds of simulations (figure 14). If the structure of the network
is sufficiently random, the error in P and A from a single EPN is O(logN/N) (see, e.g., [7]), and so in a
large population a single simulation will provide a sufficiently good estimate.
6It is possible that a small number of nodes outside of Gout are infected, but the proportion vanishes as |G| → ∞.
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Figure 15: Same as figure 14, but calculated through a single EPN for each T . The noise is substantially
reduced in the P calculations, but slightly increased in the A calculations.
B The basic reproductive ratio
In this appendix we provide examples demonstrating the need for the more careful definition of R0 in
section 2, and we explore properties of this definition.
A pair of simple examples demonstrates the difficulties with the standard definition. In our first example,
the standard definition suggests no epidemic is possible (R0 < 1), while in fact they are. In our second
example, the standard definition suggests epidemics are possible (R0 > 1), while in fact they are not.
For the first example, consider a fully-connected population of |G| ≫ 1 nodes. We add 3|G| isolated nodes
and consider a disease for which T = 3/|G| . A node in the connected component will infect on average 3
nodes, while an isolated node infects none. On average therefore, a random index case infects 0.75 other
nodes. Under the standard definition R0 = 0.75 and epidemics should be impossible. However, if the index
case is in the connected component, the introduction is likely to lead to an epidemic.
Alternately, consider a population of |G| nodes with each node having three neighbours. For simplicity we
assume no short cycles. Assume that a disease spreads with probability p ∈ (1/3, 1/2) to a given neighbour.
The average number of secondary infections caused by a single introduced infection is 3p > 1, giving R0 > 1
under the standard definition. However, each secondary infection has only two susceptible neighbours, and
so infects on average 2p < 1 neighbours, and the outbreak dies out.
Some of these issues have been dealt with by [12], who considered compartmental deterministic models of
several types of individuals. At early time nonlinear terms are unimportant, and the profile of the infected
population aligns with the eigenvector of the “next-generation” matrix. In stochastic settings, the same
alignment occurs, but it may do so more quickly or slowly than predicted and for some realisations it
may instead die out. To make a more rigorous definition of R0, we turn to statements about the average
behaviour. We set
R0,r =
E[Nr+1]
E[Nr]
to be the ratio of the expected number of infections in rank r + 1 to the expected number in rank r. This
value is affected by local small-scale structures. If the network is small, it is also affected by the finite size of
the network, but if the network is large enough relative to r, we expect that the value will be unaffected by
large-scale structure. In more concrete terms, the early growth of a disease in a neighbourhood is unaffected
by whether that neighbourhood is part of a city of 100000, 1 million, or 10 million. As the disease spreads
further, the effect of the finite city size will be noticeable for the smaller cities first. If the population is large
enough, the ratio converges before the finite size has any impact. We define R0 mathematically as
R0 = lim
r→∞
lim
|G|→∞
R0,r . (16)
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Figure 16: A comparison of the convergence of R0,r, Rˆr, and Rr for epidemics in the EpiSimS network
(T = 0.075), an unclustered bimodal network (T = 0.3 with each node’s degree coming either from a Poisson
distribution peaked at 3 or a Poisson distribution peaked at 6), and an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network (T = 0.3,
average degree 4). The calculations used 105 simulations for each network. Note the difference in vertical
scales.
This definition is similar to that of [42], who used
Rˆr = E[Nr+1]
1/(r+1)
R0 = lim sup
r→∞
lim sup
|G|→∞
Rˆr , (17)
which is the limit as r → ∞ of the geometric mean of R0,1, . . . ,R0,r−1 (assuming the limit exists). This
definition is more general and will converge in some cases where (16) does not. However, if (16) does converge
(and typically we see that it does), then it reaches the same value, but does so sooner. So to clearly see R0
from (17), we must have a larger network.
Another suitable definition would be
Rr = E[Nr+1/Nr]
R0 = lim
r→∞
lim
|G|→∞
Rr , (18)
where the expectation is taken over realisations with Nr 6= 0. This will tend to require more steps to converge
because it counts small outbreaks equally with large outbreaks, and so outbreaks which have not yet grown
and are dominated by stochastic effects would be as important to the average as well-established epidemics.
A comparison of these three definitions of R0 is shown in figure 16. They all result in similar values
for R0. For a clustered network, equation (16) converges more quickly. For large unclustered networks,
R0,r = Rr and both converge to R0 at r = 1 while Rˆr takes longer. In an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network, all three
definitions give R0,r = R0 for all r; only noise due to insufficient simulations affects the calculation.
To be fully rigorous, the |G| → ∞ limit must be appropriately defined. It does not make sense to talk
about |G| → ∞ for a given network, and we cannot simply add nodes to the pre-existing network. We must
take a sequence of networks in such a way that the small-scale structure is preserved, and as the network
size grows, the size of the preserved structure increases.
To make this rigorous, we follow [33]. Take a sequence of finite networks Gn, with |Gn| → ∞ as n→∞.
We define Br to be the network induced on the set of nodes within distance r of a central node. The sequence
of networks is taken so that the probability that the structure surrounding a randomly chosen central node
is isomorphic to a given Br is the same for all Gn if n ≥ r. This means that the small-scale structure in the
different networks is the same, and the size of what is considered “small-scale” increases with n.
We note that although the |G| → ∞ limit may be well-defined, it is possible that the r → ∞ limit in
(16) does not converge. This may occur because, for example, growth within a neighbourhood may happen
at one rate, while spread between neighbourhoods in a suburb may happen at another, and spread between
suburbs in a city may happen at yet another. If the rate of spread continues to change as the grouping size
changes, then the r →∞ limit may not exist. An effect analogous to this may appear in [1] which considered
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Figure 17: A comparison of the convergence of R0,r, Rˆr, and Rr for the same networks and conditions as
in figure 16 except using a single EPN for each data point with 105 different index cases within that EPN
rather than 105 distinct simulations [actually at submission the first two plots used only 103 index cases,
more will be added when calculations complete].
disease spread in Italy. Two distinct growth rates are seen depending on whether the disease is spreading in
the general country or in Rome.
Finally, it is possible to estimate R0 using a single EPN rather than multiple simulations. This is a much
faster process, and so it is possible to do many more simulations to reduce the noise. However, because it
is chosen from a single EPN, there may be a small systematic error. In figure 17, we plot the values for the
same conditions as in figure 16. We use the same number of index cases and so the noise is comparable.
The value of R0 is not noticably affected by choosing a single EPN rather than multiple simulations. In the
calculations in the paper, we have used a single EPN rather than multiple simulations.
C Epidemics in Configuration Model Networks
We briefly review previous work for epidemic spread in CM networks. These are the simplest networks to
investigate, and so the theory has been developed further than for other networks [3, 36, 30, 23, 32, 39, 28].
See [33, 40] for some discussion of more arbitrary unclustered networks.7 We extend the earlier theory by
allowing independently assigned edge weights.8
C.0.1 The basic reproductive ratio
Early in the spread of an infectious disease on a CM network, the probability of a node becoming infected is
proportional to its degree, and so the pdf for the degree of infected nodes is kP (k)/ 〈k〉. We choose an infected
node u with degree k uniformly from nodes of rank r. If the network is large enough that we can ignore short
cycles, then all of u’s neighbours are susceptible except the node which infected u. Thus u may infect up
to k − 1 neighbours. The probability Tout(u) that u will infect a randomly chosen neighbour is chosen from
Qout(Tout), and so the probability u infects exactly j ≤ k− 1 neighbours is
(
k−1
j
)
Tout(u)
j [1−Tout(u)]
k−1−j .
Integrating this over possible values of Tout and summing over k and j, we find that for r > 0 the rank
reproductive ratio is
R0,r =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1

kP (k) k−1∑
j=0
j
∫ (
k − 1
j
)
T jout(1− Tout)
k−1−jP (Tout)dTout

 = 〈T 〉
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈k〉
,
and so
R0 = 〈T 〉
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈k〉
(19)
7Perhaps the most significant result for non-CM networks is that if the higher degree nodes preferentially contact other high
degree nodes, then the threshold transmissibility for an epidemic is reduced.
8If edge weights are not assigned independently, then infection along different edges is not independent, and the methods of
this section do not apply.
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Thus we find that for CM networks9 R0 6= R0,0 = 〈T 〉 〈k〉.
C.0.2 Probability and size
We look for the probability that a single infected node causes a chain of infections leading to an epidemic.
Because interchanging edge direction in an EPN interchanges P and A, we may focus on calculating P .
Equivalent techniques replacing Tout by Tin below give A. Our analysis is performed in the infinite network
limit.
We set f to be the probability a randomly chosen index case does not start an epidemic. We find
f =
∑
k
(
P (k)
∫
Tout
[1− Tout + Touth]
kP (Tout)dTout
)
,
where h is the probability a randomly chosen secondary case does not start an epidemic. The value of h
satisfies the recurrence relation
h =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
(
kP (k)
∫
Tout
[1− Tout + Touth]
k−1P (Tout) dTout
)
.
If R0 < 1, the trivial solution f = h = 1 is the only solution. For R0 > 1 an additional solution appears and
is the physically relevant root. From this we can calculate P = 1− f .
Note that P depends on the distribution of Tout, but is not affected by the distribution of Tin. Similarly,
A depends on the distribution of Tin but is not affected by the distribution of Tout. This result holds for
unclustered, but not for clustered, networks.
C.0.3 Summary
We have shown that for CM networks, R0 = 〈T 〉
〈
k2 − k
〉
/ 〈k〉. In particular it depends only on the
network properties and the average transmissibility. In contrast, the probability P and size A are affected
by the details of the distribution. Intuitively, this is easy to understand. For example, if we consider A in
populations with varying Tin, at early times the rate of growth is governed by the average number of new
infections created, which depends on the average transmissibility. However, a disproportionate number of
highly susceptible nodes are infected, and so the average Tin of remaining nodes drops. By the end of the
epidemic nodes are much harder to infect than they would have been if all were equally susceptible initially,
and so the epidemic infects fewer people.
A consequence of this is that we cannot predict A based only on the early growth rate. Although
this is frequently done (see for example [27] and references therein), these calculations usually assume that
the population is homogeneously susceptible, which is not always the case, particularly when a vaccine or
previous exposure to similar diseases exists.
D The EpiSimS Network
We consider a network produced by EpiSimS for Portland, Oregon [11, 15, 5]. This simulation uses Census
data, road structure, building locations, and population surveys to construct a virtual population that travels
through the city. From the activity of individuals in the simulation, we may reconstruct who was in contact
with whom and for how long.
There are 1615860 nodes in the network, of which 1591010 are in the giant component. The average
degree is approximately 16, and the average squared degree is approximately 359. The degree distribution
has an exponential tail, and clustering is concentrated in the low-degree nodes. For our approximations of
R0, we also need information about length 2 paths. We calculate the number of pairs of nodes with each
9Unless the degree distribution satisfies
˙
k2 − k
¸
= 〈k〉2. The best-known such networks are Erdo˝s–Re´nyi networks which
have a Poisson degree distribution in the limit of large network size.
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Figure 18: Properties of the EpiSimS network. For the final plot, contact times are binned in quarter hour
increments, but exact values were used in calculations.
value of nuv for which χuv = 0 and χuv = 1. Large values of nuv are more frequent when χuv = 1. The
distribution of edge weights is fairly broad. Many contacts are very short, but the number of long contacts
is not negligible.
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